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INTRODUCTION 
First of all, I should like to thank the «Instituto da Defesa Nacional» 
forgiving me the opportunity to visit this magnificent city of Lisbon. 
It is an honour and a pleasure for me to address this distinguished and 
knowledgable audience oh two major ongoing afms control negotiations, 
namely the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security-Building 
Measures (lnd Disarmament in Europe and the Geneva USjSoviet Talks 
on Nuclear Defence and Space Arms. 
Before addressing the specifics of these negotiations, I should like 
to mak.e a few general remarks on.the relationship bet~een arms control 
and the Alliance's security policy whose fundamental- :objective is to 
ensure a lasting peace in freedom and to protect the independence of 
NATO members. In the pursuit of this goal, NATO is firmly committed 
to achieving anns control agreements which enhance stability and improve 
theprospects for crisis management ·and the prevention of war. Such 
agreements are to establish a stable balance of forces at the lowest 
possible leveI of arms. Agreements, which are to achieve these objectives, 
must be based on certain essential criteria: 
~ First, they must be militarily significant: 
dec1aratory measures which do nothing to reduce arsenaIs, limit 
their build-up or improve confidenceare inadequate to generate 
security and stability. 
~'Second, arms control agreements must also be balanced and equitable: 
this means they must take in to due account the legitimate security 
interests of all parties concerned and must not in any way diminish 
security. 
- And, third, arms controI agreements must be verifiable. They affect 
vital security interests and can therefore not be based on trust 
alone. The parties to an agreement must therefore be able to 
(*) Conferência proferida ao CDNj86, em 13 de Janeiro de 1986, pelo Dr. GUENTHER 
SEIBERT 
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ensure fuH compliance with its provisions. Due to the fundamental 
diffcrcnccs between the open Western and the c10sed Eastem 
societies and the resulting difference of degree of insight into 
military postures and activities, verification is of crucial importance. 
Reluctance on the part of the East to permit effective verification 
creates serious impediments in a number of ongoing arms éontrol 
negotiations. 
I bope that is has become c1ear from these remarks that arms controI and 
disarmament are essentiaI elements of the AIliance's security policy and 
not an alternative to it. 
The Stockholm CDE 
Let me nowturn to the StockhoIm Conference on Confidence and 
Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. The concept 
underlying this Conference is not an entirely new one: confidence-building 
measures have existed" as 10ng as nations have distrusted each~ other. A 
vast amount"of 'statecraft and diplomatic energy is being devoted to 
avoiding the use of force. Yet, there remain elements of chance, of suspicion 
and of error which could lead to the conflict that no one wants. This has 
given rise to the idea that international negotiations and agreements 
should deal especial1y with the problem of preventing wars which might 
result from misunderstanding, miscalculation or accidents. Confidence-
-building and risk-reducing efforts deal primarily with the operations of 
military forces, not their capabilities. They are designed to complement 
not to replace traditional arms controI which is directed at limiting and 
reducing military potentials. CBMs should oblige nations to act in a way 
\vhich would serve to eliminate the causes of tension and reduce the 
dangers of misunderstanding. A régime of CBMs should contain specific 
obligations requiring proofs of peaceful intent of military operations which 
could be perceived by others to be threatening. Since CSBMs cannot 
prevent acts of willfull aggression, it is essential to provide for verification 
to guard against deception. 
The post World War II period offers examples of such CBMs. Best 
known are perhaps the «hot Une» agreements which the United States, 
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France and the UK have concluded with the Soviet Union. They establish 
a direct communication link which would help to d,çfuse dangerous incidents 
or developments. Another example is the 1972 USjSoviet Incidents at 
Sea Agreement which defines rules of behaviour for American and 
Soviet naval forces operating in proximity to each other in the high seas. 
This has Iead to a marked decrease in dangerous naval encounters. 
In Europe today, there exists the greatest concentration of military 
forcesiI1r,.e;uth. Governments must therefore work to reduce military 
force leveIs. This is the objective of the MBFR negotiations. But it is 
equally important to prevent that a situation could arise in Europe in 
which misperceptions or misjudgements lead to crisis or conflict. 
The Stockholm Conference, with its 35 participating countries (33 
European states plus US and Canada) has been assigned the task of 
extending the concept of confidence-building to a wide range of military 
activities throughout Europe. The Conference is an integral part of the 
CSCE process which is to enhalJ.ce security and develop coope~ation, 
thus helping to ease the divisions between nations in Europe.. The 
Helsinki Final Act of 1975 which encompasses politicaI, economic and 
humanitarian concerns also contains a document on CBMs. It requires to 
announce major military manoeuvers exceeding 25,000 troops, 21 days in 
advance and to exchange observers on a voluntary basis. This was a 
modest first step providing valuable experience for further-reaching efforts 
in the J area of confidence-building . 
.. Át the Belgrade CSCE follow-up meeting (1977-78), the western 
countries proposed improvements of those original CBMs but no decis~on 
on . substance was taken. At a further follow-up meeting held in Madrid 
1981-83) it was agreed to convene the Stockholm Conference on the 
basis of a precisely worded mandate. According to this mandate the 
Stockholm Conference should negotiate and adopt a set of mutually 
complementary confidence andsecurity-building measures designed to 
reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe. They should be 
militarily significant, politically binding, adequately verifiable and cover 
the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. 
The CSBMs which the authors of the Madrid rnandate had in mind 
go well beyond the CBMs of the Helsiriki Final Act. This· is illustrated 
in a general way by the introduction of the concept (security-building». 
29 
"Fóllowing a preparâtory meeting in Helsinki, the Stockholm Confe-
ren6'e 'opened on 17 J~nuary 1984 and isnow entering its 3rd year. 
ritiring the first' year '(1984) membeis of the three main groups, e.g. 
The Àtlantic Alliiu:lce,' :tbe Warsaw Pact arid the NeutraI and Non-aligned 
CotIntriês submitted' 'proposaIs poiting out their respective approaches. 
SubstantlaI differences' hecame evident between the Westem and Eastern 
concepts. The West is working for more openness and calculability of 
nillitary behaviour in arder to strengthen stability and security in Eutope. 
The members of the Allianc~ have'heen the first to prdpos~a s~t of 
concrete, mutuaIly reinforcing cúrifidence and security-building .measures 
containing the elements of information,' annual forecasts, 'noÜficaton, 
observation, vedfication and communication. 
The East is mainly seeking declaratory measures containing statements 
of intent which would not change the real military situation. The first 
document tabled by the East contained the foIlowing proposal: A Treaty 
~n renunciation of force, no first use of nuclear arms, a freeze on 
miiitary ." budgets, nuclear and chemical weapon free zones in Europe 
and sQme limited CSBMs .. 
The basic approach by the neutral and non-aligned countries is very 
similar to that of the West. 
Short1y before the end of 1984, the Conference agreed on a working 
structure. Two Working Groups were established, one (B) is to deaI with 
th~ proposals or notification and observation of out of garrison activities, 
and the other (A) with all other proposaIs. This arrangementhas greatly 
cQntributed to intensifying discussions which ,vere more issue-oriented 
in 1985. 
During the past year, a number of additional papers were presented, 
many of them elaborating on previous proposaIs. 
The Allied countries contributed 6 working papers, one for each 
of their proposed measures which explain in detail their respective 
obj~ptives. 
Measure 1: Exchange of infoj~Jnation' about the organization and location 
of military forcesof all 35 participating countries at the 
óeginning of each :éalendar year. 
This measure is' to provide an actual basis upon which other 
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CSBMs, especially the notificaton of military activities, must 
dependo 
Measure 2: An exchange of annual forecasts of military exercises planned 
for the coming year. 
This would provide a basis for establishing a pattern of normal 
military activities for each of the 35 participating states and 
make military activities more predictable over a longer period. 
Deviations from the routine military behaviour could lead to 
the request for explanations by other participating states. 
Measure 3: A more detaUed notification of specific military activities 45 
days in advance: 
This is the center-piece of the Western CSBMs paçkage. 
Compared" with the Helsinki Accords, it provides for substan-
tiaI improvements: by focussing on military uni~s (e.g. army 
divisions). It see!es to enhance the" verifiability of" "notificatlons; 
the threshold for notification is lowered from 25,000" to "6,000 
troops, advance notice is extended from 21 to 45 days, and 
in addition to manoeuvers, activities such as alerts,mobiliza-
tion and amphibious activities are incIuded (out of garrison 
concept). This m'easure seeks to increase predictability in 
military activities and reduce the risk of crisis resuIting from 
the misinterpretation of the purpose of military activities. 
Measure 4: Mandatory invitations of observers to alI notifiable military 
a[:tivities: 
This would establish a mechanism for the participating states 
to regulary assure themselves that military activities are routine 
and non-threatening. 
Measure 5: Provision of means for verifying compliance with the obliga-
tions agreed at the Conference: 
As national technical means alone cannot ensure effective 
verification, this n1easure also provides for on site inspections. 
As most participating countries do not dispose of NTMs, they 
31 
NAÇAO E DEFESA 
can thus make sure that provisions of agreements are complied 
with. 
Measure 6: Communications: 
This measure seeks to improve means of communkation to 
assist in the implementation of agreed measures and to help 
resolve differences between the participating states. 
The Allies are convinced that the adoption of such concrete CSBMs 
would subStantially contribute to render a surprise attack more difficult, 
make miscalculations less likely enhance military stability and difuse inci-
pient crises. 
Largely in reply to the initiatives by NATO countries, the Soviet 
Union and other Warsaw Pact countries have also introduced 6 lVorking 
documents: a Dralt Treaty on Non-use 01 Force,' a limitation 01 military 
manoeuvres to 40,000 troops; on notilication Df major manoeuvres of 
land, naval and air forces; and of major military movements and transfers 
in and out the zone 01 application. Most of these proposals aim at inter-
fering with normal peacetime military activities of NATO while presen-
ting no problem for the Warsaw Pacto They also seek to inc1ude indepen-
dent naval and air activities which are 110t covered by the mandate. 
Last autumn, the neutral and non-aligned countries also produced a 
detailed position paper which, on the whole, is much doser to the 
Western than to the Eastern concept. This is in particular true for noti-
fication and observation modalities and annual forecasts. In other areas 
such as constraints there are certains differences. 
AlI major proposaIs are now on the negotiating table. During the 
last round which ended on 20 December, 5 NNA coordinators were 
nominated for various subjects (Austria: NUF; Switzerland: information, 
verification, communication, constraints and annual calendars; Sweden: 
notification; Finland: observation). This provide.s the organizational basis 
for the transition to the drafting process which may start early this year. 
In the wake of the Geneva Summit, the atmosphere at Stokholm 
has improved but the East has not yet made any real concessions. The 
Soviet Union is pressing for a reafirmation of the non-use of force 
principIe but does no longer insist on most of its declaratory proposals. 
On information and verification the Soviet position is very rigid. Flexibi-
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lity on annual forecasts,' notification and observation is lnade conditional 
on the incIusion of independent naval and air activities which are not 
covered by the mandate. This demand is unaccepÚlbIe to the West. 
The West has declared its readiness to reaffirm the non-use of force 
principIe if it is given effect and expression by concrete CSBMs. The 
Western CSBMs proposaI is not a take-it-or-leave-it position, nor is it the 
outer limit of what a concluding document couId be. But a mereIy 
cosmetic improvement of the Helsinki Accords would be clearly insufficient. 
There is a reasonable chance for a substantive·concludil1g document. 
But there are also formidable negotiating obstacles stilI ahead, and we 
must realisticaIIy be prepared for difficult negotiations in the upcoming 
drafting phase . 
. In, view of the CSCE foIlow-up meeting, whichwill openort 4th No-
vember ,198.6, in Vienna, the:Stockholm Conference' will suspend its work 
on 19th September. Until'then there will be 4 more riegotiating,rounds, 
the next one starting on 28th January. Time is therefóre running short. 
The Vienna meeting will review the results of the Stockholm Confe~ 
rence together with other CSCE activities such as the Ottawa Forum '011 
Human Rights, the Budapest Cultural Forum or the Bern Meeting on 
Human Contacts which will take place next month. If the Stockholm, 
Conference cannot complete its work on a concluding document by Sep-
tember, it is up to the Vienna meeting to decide in the continuation of 
the Conference. 
US/Geneva Talks 012 Nuclear, Defence and Space Weapons 
The resumption of the bilateral US/Soviet Arms ControI Talks was 
perhaps the most important deveIoprnent in the area of arms controI 
in 1985. After more than one year of suspension of the talks, the Soviet 
Union dropped its precondition that US intermediate range nuclear 
systems deployed in Europe must be withdrawn before the talks could 
resume. Tbe Soviets finally recognized that the Western governments 
were not prepared to allow tbem a monopoly on this c1ass of weapons 
and they went back to the negotiating tablewhich they should never 
have left. This, was a success for the solidarity and cohesion of the Alliance 
which had made it cIear aIl along that INF deployments would continue 
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until a negotating resuIt was achieved which permitted their halt,· reversal 
oI- complete elimination. 
The oblectives of the Geneva negotations were set out in a joint 
statement of 8th January, 1985 as follows: 
....;... to 'work out effective agreementsaimed at limiting and reducing 
strategic and intermediate nuclear forces; 
~ to prevent an arms race in outer space and to terminate it on earth; 
: ~ to strengthen strategic stability; 
- and as a long-term objective, to work for a complete elimination 
of nuclear weapons. 
Compared with the previous negotations on strategic and LRINF 
forces, which tookplace Iram 1981-85, a third subject was added, that of 
defence and space weaporis. It was agreed:that all these subjects should 
be considered and resolved in «their interrelationship». 
The US holds the view that this interrelationship has two aspects: 
On the one hand, the number of strategic defence systems depends on the 
number and nature of offensive systems. On the other hand, an affective 
strategic defense provides an incentive to reduce offencive nuclear systems. 
The Soviet Union interprets this relationship in a different way: It insists 
that the US abandon their SDI research programme before limitations 
and reductions of strategic and LRlNF systems can be achieved. This 
view is not shared by the West which believes, on the contrary, that 
partial apreements could pave the way to a comprehensive solution. 
There have been three negotiating rounds in 1985. In the first round, 
a working structure was· agreed - which provicles for three negotiating 
groups - one for each subject: START, LRINF" and Defence and Space 
Weapons. They normally rileet once a week. Plenary meetings with the 
complete delegations are convened on an ad hoc basis. 
The three negotiating groupsdeal with the following subjects: 
The Group on Strategic Arms "Reduction (START) deals with inter-
continental range (over 5.500 kms) offensive nuclear forces. They inc1ude 
land-based ICBMs, submarine~based missiles, strategic bombers inc1uding 
air-launched missiles (ALeM) and sea-based cruise missiles. 
In order to reduce the" risk of first strike agaiIist the land-based 
nuclear potentials - which is the most vulnerable element of the str~tégic 
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triad - the US attaches high priority to substancial reductions' of heavy 
ICBMs carriyng multipIe independently targetabIe warheads (MIRVs). 
Du'ring the first two rounds, the US negotiators expIained their concept 
aimed at deep balanced and verifiable reductions designed to enhance 
strategic stability. 
They proposed: 
- a reduction of the number of ballistic missiles by about 1/3 to 
5,000 warheads for the US and the Soviet Union; 
- a limitation Df heavy bombers to 400 and a limitation of the 
numbers of ALCMs on bombers; 
- a limitation Df the number of multiple warheads to no more than 
10 on ICBMs and 14 00 SLBMs; 
- and a limitation Df the destructive power by reduction of the 
ballistic missile throwweight. 
This would have meant reductions well below the SALT II limits. 
In view of the existiog assymetries of the strategic potentials with the 
Soviet Unioo having about 3 times the oumber of warheads on land:-based 
ICBMs and the US having a similar advantage 00 SLBMs, the US declare'd 
its readiness to «trade of!» greater Soviet reductions in ICBMs by cor-
responding deeper cuts in the American strategic bombers. The US concept 
is that, in the longer nm, the emphasis in the strategic arsenaIs should 
shift from crisis sensitive ICBMs to SLBMs which are less. vuInerable 
and therefore can beUer contribute to strategic stability. 
The Soviet Union, in the first two rounds, limited itself to propose 
a freeze on the mutuaI strategic potentials which would have contrac-
tualized the Soviet advantages gained through its massive strategic moder-
nization programme of the 70 ies. 
The Group on Long-range Intermediate Nuclear Forces deals with 
the reduction and limitation of land-based LRINF (e. g. missiles and 
cruise missiles) and LRINF aircraft. Furthermore, a solution must be 
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sOllght to prevent that an LRINF agreement is undercut by tacticaI missiles 
(SRINF). I am referring, to the so called «counter measures» in the forrn 
o{~~,.p!ny~e,Jilt~ of SQviet SS~21, 22 and 23 missiles against Western Europe. 
- In the talks, the US reaffirmed its preference for a complete mutuaI 
efunination of alI land-baS'ed LRINF. If this was not acceptable to the 
Soviet Union, the US could also envisage an interirn agreernent reducing 
the warheads on LRINF to the lowest leveI acceptable to the Soviet 
Union. The US ais o pointed out that, within equal global ceilings, it 
would not off-set the total Soviet SS-20 potential by US deployments in 
Europe. 
The Soviet Union, in turn, argued for a freeze on US' LRINF in 
exchange for a halt iil' its so called counter measures.. Such a moratoriurn 
would have contractualize'd a Soviet advantage of 8 to 1 and was conse-
quently rejected by the USo 
The Group on Defence and Space \Veapons is mainly concerned with 
the future relationship of offensive and defensive weapons with a view 
to strengthening strategic stability. This is not a completely new theme 
if one thinks of the efforts undertaken by the SALT I Interim Agreement 
and the ABM Treaty which together should have provided the ba~is for 
deep reductions in offensive nuclear systems - a hope which unfortunately 
has not come true. 
Another task of this Group is to achieve an agreernent providing 
efficient protection against anti-satellite systems CASAT), as satellites 
through reconnaissance and comnlunication do contribute to global 
strategic stability. In this context, it must, however, be taken into consi-
deration that the Soviet Union has an operational ASAT system while the 
US system is still in the testing phase. 
In" the ,. talks so far the US has explained the concept underlying its 
SDI programme and offered to explore together with the Soviet Union 
the possible contribution which defensive systems could make to enhance 
strategic. stability, but the US has a1so expressed concern about Soviet 
activitie·s which tend to undercut the ABM Treaty, and ithas referred 
in particular to the Krasnoyarsk radar which 'constitutes aviolation of 
this Treaty.~ 
The .Soyiet Union insisted on a moratorium for defence and what it 
called <~~p~~e strike weapons» including research, development and 
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deployment of such systems.. The US declined this proposal on the 
grounds that: 
. - the Soviet Union already has an operationI ABM system which 
would not be affected by a moratorium; 
- research Ís not verifiable and is therefore permitted under the AB1vI 
Treaty; 
On balance, not· very much progress was made during the ear1y phases 
of the negotiations due to the intransigent position adopted by the Soviet 
Union which compared with the negotiations in 1983 had even hardened 
its position on several issues. 
It was not until early October, shortly before the Geneva Summit, 
l.hat he Soviet Union advanced counter proposaIs which finaIIy specified 
the Soviet negotiating positon. 
The key element of the Soviet eounter proposals is a eall for 50 per 
eent reductions in «strategic» nuclear delivery vehic1es. The other main 
elements of the Soviet proposaIs are: 
- a ceiling of 6,000 on the total number of se ealled nuclear charges 
with no 'more than 60 per cent of these charges on any component 
of the strategic triad. This would limit the permitted ICBM re-entry 
vehic1es (RVs) to 3,600. 
-a banon all· <<long-range» (e. g. more than 600 kms) eruise 
. missiles inchidingALCMs SLCMs and GLCMs; 
- a ban on all «riew» nuclear' delivery systems defining <<new» as 
those systems which have no! yet been tested of an agreed date. 
The Soviet proposaI on LRINF eontains the following elements: 
- the removal of Pershing II; 
- ínterim deployment of 100-120 US ground launcher cruise missiles 
in Europe. USSR would retairt 650 LRINF, since it asserts the 
right to compensate for British and French systems. If Brita.inand 
France increased their nurriber, more SS-20s couId be deployed or . 
US GLCMs must be withdrawn. (The number of UK and F 
warheads is put at 530. It ís not cIear how this figure was' reiched). 
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- there would be a freeze on the number of SS-20 in Asia on the 
condition that no change -takes place in the strategic situation there. 
- On defence and strategic weapons, the Soviet proposal calls for a 
moratorium on alI aspects of space defence and a ban on ASAT 
systems. The Soviets reaffirm the linkage which holds _progress 
in the negotiations on nuclear arms hostage to the abandonning 
of the SDI research programme by the USo Although the Soviets 
hinted that an interim INF agreement might be envisaged, the 
linkage has not been formally dropped. 
The fact that the Soviet Union has finally specified its position and 
envisages, for the first tiine, substantial relductions in Soviet forces is a 
positive development in the negotiations which was generalIy welcomed 
by the West. If one looks, however, beyond the spectacular call for 50 per cent 
reductions, at the fine print of the proposaI, its shortcomings are evident. 
Let me point out just a few major flaws: 
The Soviet definition of strategic systems would include, on the US 
side, LRINF missile launchers in Europe, dual capabIe US aircraft in 
Europe and dual capable aircraft on 15 US aircraft carriers. 
While thus more than 1100 such US systems would be subject to 
reduction, more than 2000 comparable Soviet systems would not be limited. 
The US would thus be Ieft with the choice of a marked inferiority in the 
strategic triad or one-sided reductions in the field of nuclear and conventional 
intermediate-range capabilities. The Iatter would mean reducing or limiting 
US support for its Aliies. 
Furthermore, the proposed ban on new types of nuclear delivery 
vehicles would prec1ude the US Trident D5, planned light mobile ICBM 
called «Midgetman» and the Advance'd Techonology Bomber while permit-
ting the Soviets to depIoy its S5-25 ICBM and the Black Jack heavy 
bomber, systems which have already been tested. 
On LRINF, the USSR continues to insist on compensation for third 
country &ystems which is unacceptable to the West. The Soviet proposal 
implies only sl1ght reductions of SS - 205 in Europe and leaves the SS - 20 
potentiaI in Asia unconstrained although a substantial part of it aIso 
constitutes a threat to Europe. This would lead to a Soviet superiority 
in this category of weapons of more than 10 to 1. 
38 
THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AND THE GENEVA USjSOVIET TALKS 
These and other shortcomings lead to the cQnclusion that the Soviet 
proposaI is one-sided and self -serving. Nevertheless, the fact that the 
Soviets have accepted the principIe of deep reductions is a welcome deve-
lopment if equitabIy applied. The positive elements of the proposal should 
be explored in order to work on them. This is what the United States 
did when it presented, only a few weeks later, a new proposalof its own. 
Its main elements are: 
Srrategic cnd D:!fense Forces 
...::.:.. reductions to a limit of 4500 on reentry vehicles (RVs) on ICBMs 
and SLBMs, about 50 per cent below current leveIs; 
- reductions to álimit of 3,000 RRVs carried by ICBMs, about 
50 per cent below the current Soviet leveland roughly halfway 
between the earlier US proposaI for a limit of 2,500 and the limit 
of 3,600 proposed by the Soviet; 
- a 50 per cent reduction in the highest overall ballistic missile 
throwweight to put a constraint on heavy destabilizing ICBMs 
(USSR: 11.9 milI pounds - US: 4.4 mill pounds); 
-:- contingent upon acceptance on RV and throwweight limits, the US 
would accept a limit of 1,500 ALCMs on heavy bombers which- would 
be 50 per cent be10w planned US deployments; 
- reductions in strategic ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs) to a 
limit of 1,250 to 1,450 about 50 per cent below the current higher 
Soviet leveI; 
- contingent upon acceptance of this limit, the US would agree to 
further duce the proposed limits on heavy strategic bombers 
from 400 to 350; 
- furthermore, a ban on all new heavy IC~Ms and, because of 
difficulties in verification, on alI mobile ICBMs. 
Intermediate nuclear forces 
The US cohtinu~s to prefer the total elimination af this whole cat~gory 
of weapons. As an interim step toward this goal the United States proposes: 
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- a limit of 140 LRINF launchers in Europe (which corresponds 
to the number deployed at the end of 1985) in retum for"reductions 
of SS - 20 launchers within range of Europe to the same number; 
- proportional reductions of SS - 20 launchers in Asia (outside range 
of Europe); 
"" - constraints on short-range INF; 
Defence and Space Arms 
The US made it clear that it will pursue the SDI research permitted 
by and in full compliance with the ABM Treaty. 
The US ais o proposed an. «open Iaboratories» arrangement under 
\vhich both sides wouId provide information on each other's strategic 
defence research programmes and provi de opportunities for visiting as~ociated 
research facilities and laboratories. " 
Vcriliéation and Compliance 
Against the background of strong concerns about Soviet violations 
of existing arms control arrangements, especially the SALT and ABM 
Treaties, the US stressed the need for effective verification and striet 
compliance. 
This comprehensive US offer builds on previous US proposaIs and 
positive elements of the Soviet counter proposaI. It tries to pave the way 
for serious negotiations." 
The subject matter of the Nuclear Defence and Space Talks also 
figured prominently in the djscussions between President Reagan and 
General Secretary Gorbachev at the Geneva Summit. The two sides 
agreed to accelerate the work at these negotiations and also' underscored 
the principIe of 50 per cent reductions in the nuclear arms of the two 
sides and the idea o'f an interim INF agreement. 
However, despite the results at the Summit, there are still major 
differences between the two sides. Prominent examples include the questioll 
of what should be counted in the 50 per cent reductions of each side. 
In tbis area, the Soviets have reverted to a position which they put 
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forward and" then abandonned in both SAL T í· and lI. On intermediate 
nuclear forcesthe Soviet demand for compensátion for British and Frenph 
systems, which wouId secure unilateral advantages for the USSR, remains 
a key obstácIe. On the strategic defence issue the . Soviets insist on" an 
unverifiabIe ban onUS SOl research while leaving open to pursue anaIo-
gous Sovietre~.earch. The URSS also maintains a rigid linkage between 
its demand to abandon SOl and progress on nuclear arms. 
Despite these major differences, which· continue to exist in all three 
areas of negotiations, there is now a" chance to define . comInon gTound 
in· an improved atmosphere of East-West relations. I" hope that it has 
become 'cIear from 'what I have said before 'that the subjects dealt with 
in Geneva are formidabIy complex ando progress wiIl neither be quick 
nor easy to achieve. On 16th January,negotfations will resume in Geneva. 
Qnly time will teU whether the Soviets are ready for a process of fa.ir 
gi\'c and take. 
CONCLUSION 
Let me conclude on a more general note. \Ve do not know today 
whether 1985, with the resumption of the negotiations in Geneva and 
the Summit mecting between Presidcnt Reagan and General Secretary 
Gorbachev, will mark the beginning of a lasting turn for the better. 
AlI chances are that we will see more active negotiations in Geneva, 
Stockholm and Vienna. The best signal we can give to the Soviet Union 
at the beginning of this year is that we wilI energetical1y explore alI 
opportunities which may now be opened up, but that we will not do so 
at the expense of our security interests. 
The Soviet leadership views disarmament in more than one dimension 
and seeks to influence the outcome not only at the negotiating table 
itself but also tries to expIoit differences within the Alliance and to 
create pressure for concessions through attempts to influence public and 
I have no doubt that the Soviet Union wiIl continue this double strategy, 
and we will get nowhere if we do not hold out for agreements which are 
both equitable and verifiable. 
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NAÇÃO E DEFESA 
The strength of the Westem position in all these negotiations depends 
on the political support in AIlied countries. Oose consultations among 
the Allies are indispensable for the cohesion of the Alliance. Last year, 
this process of consultations has been very successful. In addition to the 
regular meetings within the anns controI co-ordinating mechanisms, there 
have been 9 meetings of theeouncil with Secretary Shultz, Ambassador 
. Nitze and the Heads .01: ·the US negotiating team in Geneva. There have 
also been 7 meetings of the Special Consultative Gro~p where the con-
sultations on the LRINF -negotiations take place. It is essentiaI that 
these ·consultations are ·continued to th~ fullest possible extent. 
The Atlantic Alliancehas safely passed through a difficuIt period of 
East-West relations. It has done so by adhering to the mainline of a 
policy which makes clear .its determination to maintain defences and at 
the same time work for. disarmament and a more constructive relationship 
with the East. If the AIlies stick to this policy, there is no reason why 
we should not look to the future with confidence. 
Guenther Seibert 
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